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1. Introduction 
The draft of Janusz Lewandowski, European Commissioner responsible for the budget, for the 
European budget 2013 caused quite some debate. The proposal included a 6.8% increase in 
expenditure, which many government leaders believe can hardly be justified at a time when 
they have make cuts ‘at home’. However, the debate on the European budget was largely a 
rearguard fight, because most expenditure is fixed in the de Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) 2006-2013. Here and there marginal changes are possible but, by and large, the 
general outlines are fixed. The disputes over the EU budget for next year were, as such, 
therefore more a prelude to the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-
2020. 
The opening move for the negotiations on the MFF was Lewandowski’s proposal to invest 
today in tomorrow’s growth [see Annex 1], leaning on the proposals for modernisation of the 
European budget. In this, he is supported by the Netherlands, which is backing the 
modernisation of the European budget. The aim of the Dutch government is moreover to 
secure the rebate received earlier on its EU contribution and to reduce the level of 
expenditure. This chapter addresses the question of whether the Dutch interest is best served 
by a strategy focused on thinking in terms of ‘juste retour’ – i.e. retaining the rebate and 
limiting European expenditure – or whether the government is best guided by what Alexis de 
Tocqueville has called ‘self-interest rightly understood’, which in this case is based on 
reallocation of expenditure with a view to stimulating economic growth and thus tackling the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
This chapter first focuses on the unique character of the European budget [section 2]. We then 
look back on the Dutch position during the negotiations on the Financial Perspectives 2007-
2013 [section 3]
2
. The subsequent sections respectively address the opening position of the 
European Commission [section 4] and the Dutch position [section 5] in the negotiations on 
the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. The Netherlands aims for modernisation of 
the budget in which case the current rebate on the Dutch contribution to the European Union 
could be dropped. The chapter ends with some concluding observations cumulating in a plea 
for compensation on the expenditure side instead of on the revenue side of the budget. 
 
2. The European budget: a budget ‘sui generis’ 
The budget of the European Union can best be characterised as a budget ‘sui generis’. A large 
part of the revenue comes [74%] from payments by the Member States, which is dependent 
on the level of their Gross National Income [GNI]. The remainder is collected in the form of, 
amongst others, Member States’ levies on agricultural products and imports of goods [a 
                                                          
1. The authors would like to thank three persons directly involved for the background information 
they provided. 
2. Until recently, the multiannual agreements on European finances were called ‘Financial 
Perspectives’. Today, they are referred to as Multiannual Financial Framework. 
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country may keep 25% of the yield]. Legally, import levies are a source of income for the 
European budget, but is considered by the Dutch government as payment to the European 
Union. Finally, the Member States have to transfer a percentage of their VAT revenue to the 
EU. 
Figure 1: Development of the European budget by income category [1958-2008]
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The EU budget is relatively small compared with the budgets of the Member States. Total 
expenditure is set at about 1% of the common Gross Domestic Product [EU GDP] of 
European Member States, as a result of which entire spending categories, which national 
budgets do include, are left out of consideration, irrespective of political or economic 
considerations in favour of centralisation
4
. Moreover, according to critics, the budget is not up 
to date, does not meet the demands of the day, and is locked in path dependency, thus 
seriously limiting possible or desirable changes
5
. These same critics claim that the potential 
impact of the EU budget is, as such, negligible
6
. The question is whether this criticism is 
justified. First of all, the EU’s policy is, to a considerable extent, shaped by non-financial 
instruments, in this case regulation and coordination. The budget is often not the most 
important instrument
7
. Secondly, implementation largely takes place at national level, the 
costs of which are borne by the Member States. These therefore impact on the national instead 
of the European budget. Moreover, financial instruments often involve co-financing, such as 
in the case of cohesion policy and structural funds. The EU budget, as such, thus paints a 
somewhat distorted picture of the level of European expenditure. The level of the budget may 
                                                          
3. Data provided by DG Budget. 
4. Begg, Iain (2009), Fiscal Federalism, Subsidiarity and the EU Budget Review, SIEPS, p. 51. 
5. Begg (2009) op. cit., p. 11. 
6. Begg, Iain, Sapir, Andre; Eriksson, Jonas (2008), The Purse of the European Union: Setting 
Priorities for the Future, SIEPS, p. 9; Lejour, Arjan; Molle, Willem (2011), The Value Added of 
the EU Budget: Subsidiarity and Effectiveness, The Hague: Centraal Planbureau [CPB - 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis], Presentation at the joint CEPS-SIEPS seminar 
‘The Next Long-Term Budget: What Should Go In? What Should Go Out?’, Brussels, 9 March. 
7. Pisani-Ferry, Jean (2008), Comments on Begg and Molle, paper delivered at the BEPA Conference 
on Public Finances in the EU, under the auspices of the European Commission, Brussels, 4 April; 
Tarschys, Daniel (ed.) (2011), The EU Budget. What Should Go In/ What Should Go Out? SIEPS, 
p. 13. 
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be low, but the interests are considerable judging by the heated debates over a reallocation of 
available resources
8
. 
Figure 2: Development of the European budget by spending category [1958-2008]
9
 
 
The European budget is mainly characterised by redistribution. The main part of the European 
budget goes to agricultural policy, which is considered as a barely disguised form of income 
support for farmers [42.5%], and to the structural funds [35.6%] which are largely about 
pumping money around. In this context, mention should be made of underspending of the 
structural funds because Member States have insufficient absorption capacity
10
. The effect of 
the expenditure is moreover difficult to determine
11
. 
The annual budget is ‘dictated’ to a considerable extent by the so-called Multiannual 
Financial Framework [previously Financial Perspectives] which covers a period of seven 
years. It is therefore important for a Member States to seize its chance during the negotiations 
on the MFF before the annual budget is adopted. The annual budget should then remain below 
the stipulated MFF ceilings. In practice, the budget often stays below the established spending 
caps because a number of programmes are not realised, or are not fully spent because the 
Member States do not have enough funds for co-financing. For instance, the amount of 
commitments of 1.00% of EU GDP corresponds with actual spending of around 0.94 of EU 
                                                          
8. The discussion on [the content of] the EU budget largely takes place in terms of ‘public goods’. To 
what extent does it involve ‘public goods’: what is the added value? (Heineman, Friedrich (2011), 
‘European Added Value for the EU Budget’, in Daniel Tarschys (ed.) The EU Budget. What 
Should Go In/ What Should Go Out? SIEPS). A problem is that it is not exactly clear what is to be 
understood by ‘public goods’, let alone European ‘public goods’. The arguments that can be 
derived from the theory of ‘fiscal federalism’ regarding centralisation and decentralisation do not 
provide enough support. The same applies to the subsidiarity principle according to which, for 
reasons of efficiency, services are best provided at national level. 
9. Data provided by DG Budget. 
10. Bos, Marko; Riel, Bart van (2011), ‘Naar een nieuw begrotingskader voor de EU’ [Towards a new 
budget framework for the EU], Economisch Statistische Berichten 96(4618) 16 September, p. 540. 
11. ECORYS, CPB and IFO (2008), A Study on EU Spending, Rotterdam; Lejour; Molle (2011) op. 
cit., p. 107. 
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GDP
12
. Unlike the annual budget – which is adopted by qualified majority – the MFF requires 
unanimity
13
. 
 
3. The Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 
In the run-up to the negotiations on the multiannual budget for 2006-2013, the cabinet had 
already achieved a significant result as regards future spending of European agricultural 
policy. In autumn 2002, it was agreed in Brussels that the agricultural budget would remain 
constant in real terms until the end of 2013 [i.e. would only be adjusted for inflation]. As a 
result, the negotiations on the largest spending category of the EU budget only dealt with the 
question of whether the ceiling should also apply to new Member States [i.e. Bulgaria and 
Romania] and with the development of expenditure on rural development.  
Together with his colleagues, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, 
had reviewed all necessary expenditure. The result was an expansive opening move [between 
1.14% and 1.21% of EU GNI] made by the European Commission to the Member States. The 
proposal was rejected as too ambitious and unrealistic by the Dutch Council Presidency 
[second half of 2004], following which a round of consultations was held. In consultation 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance then developed the ‘building 
blocks’ method, whereby information had to be provided about both the total amount of 
money and the allocation of resources per spending category
14
 
15
. A couple of countries – 
Belgium and Luxembourg – were not inclined to cooperate, because they were satisfied with 
the European Commission’s review. The consultations showed that most Member States 
preferred a lower instead of the higher multiannual budget as provided for by the Prodi 
package. Thus, it soon became clear that the demand of the European Commission was quite 
different from the Member States’ preference. The Commission proposal therefore hardly 
came into play during the negotiations
16
.  
The Dutch position during the negotiations initially focused on the following: 
 The Dutch contribution to the EU is proportionate to that of Member States with a similar 
level of prosperity; 
 The expenditure framework of the EU that does not exceed 1% of EU GNI; 
 The agricultural budget will not be increased for new Member States; 
 The cohesion funds will be limited to the poor regions in the poorest Member States. 
                                                          
12. Peet, John (2005), The EU Budget. A Way Forward, London: Centre for European Reform, p. 2. 
13. In his annual New Year’s message, the former secretary-general of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs proposed to abolish the veto on the European multiannual budget, after a solution has been 
found for the net contributor position, so that funds can quickly be transferred from ‘old to new’ 
(Oosterwijk, Jan Willem (2007), ‘Maatwerk en modernisering in Europa’ [Customisation and 
modernisation in Europe’], Economisch Statistische Berichten 12 januari, p. 7). 
14. Zalm, Gerrit (2009), De romantische boekhouder [The romantic bookkeeper], Amsterdam: 
Uitgeverij Balans. 
15. The ‘building blocks’ method is an effective way of changing the playing field. During the 
negotiations on the financial perspectives of 2000-2006 [Agenda 2000] the net contributing 
Member States had put the so-called ‘Table C’ on the agenda, with ceilings for each category of 
expenditure. This determined the room of negotiation between both proposals. The Commission 
proposal was not the centrepiece of the negotiations. 
16. The same applies to the role of the European Parliament, which, by its own account, had hardly 
any influence on the outcome of the negotiations due to a combination of limited competences and 
internal division (Lange, Esther de (2011), Financial Perspectives After 2013. Presentation for the 
IMP program, Brussels: European Parliament, 30 March. 
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In the course of the negotiations, the Dutch position increasingly concentrated on a 1 billion 
rebate on the EU contribution. This focus on a rebate on our contribution to the EU – in line 
with the British rebate – thus marks an important turning point in Dutch thinking on European 
integration, defining the Dutch position to this day.  
In his memoires De romantische boekhouder (The romantic bookkeeper) Gerrit Zalm puts 
forward the following arguments for this strategy
17
: 
 A euro less paid to Europe is a euro that the Netherlands can spend entirely in line with its 
own priorities; 
 A euro of European budget for the benefit of the Netherlands is not part of the national 
budget and reflects, as such,  the European priorities and requirements for subsidy; 
 The rules and regulations for subsidy are complicated and contain many administrative 
conditions that must be met. Consequently, the money is often not spent; 
 The money has to paid back, possibly with a fine, when it turns out afterwards that not all 
conditions have been met. 
However, he adds that his arguments have never been narrow-nationalist. He had always 
accepted that the Netherlands, being a prosperous country, would be a net payer rather than a 
net recipient. The Dutch stance was geared to a general rebate arrangement instead of a 
separate treatment
18
. 
Subsequently, during the Luxembourg Presidency, the ‘building blocks’ method was replaced 
by the ‘negotiation boxes’ approach, which involved ever-increasing fine-tuning: first the 
principles of the policy were defined and then the parameters were set for the further 
allocation of available resources. Finally, an overview was made of the consequences for the 
Member States
19
. The proposals contained, in principle, all negotiation points, thus preventing 
agreements on separate issues. In the last phase, the level of expenditure could thus be 
brought in line with the proposals concerning the allocation of available resources. 
The ‘negotiation boxes’ method failed to produce an agreement because three countries – the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom– did not accept the individual rebate on 
payments which, in their view, was too low. In the subsequent negotiations during the 
Council Presidency of the United Kingdom, which shared the Dutch view on the rebate on the 
contribution, agreement was finally reached. The expenditure framework and thus the 
contribution of the Member States were reduced, and, as a result, the Netherlands received a 1 
billion rebate on its EU contribution. In exchange, the key for the allocation of resources has 
been revised to make the agreement also profitable for net recipients. Negotiators regarded the 
common interest of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as an important success factor
20
. 
Finally, during the negotiations on the financial perspectives, a few Member States, including 
the Netherlands, stipulated that there be a fundamental debate on the modernisation of the 
European budget. One of the things they objected to was the incremental nature of the 
European budget, due to which the utility and necessity of whole spending categories are not 
or only marginally scrutinised once the MFF had been adopted. Therefore, the heads of state 
                                                          
17. Zalm (2009) op. cit., pp. 334-335. 
18. Zalm (2009) op. cit., p. 342. 
19. Bachtler John and Wishlade, Fiona (2005), From Building Blocks to Negotiating Boxes: The 
Reform of EU Cohesion Policy, Glasgow: European Policies Research Centre. 
20. Zalm (2009) op. cit., pp. 336-337. 
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and government of the Member States commissioned a Budget Review, involving a 
comprehensive reassessment of the European public finances
21
 
22
.  
 
4. The Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 
The proposal of the European Commission  
Already in autumn 2010, the European Commission published a first Communication on the 
possibilities to modernise the MFF
23
. The final outlines of the proposal were adopted in May 
2011, after, on a tour of the capitals, Lewandowski had consulted the individual Member 
States on the question of whether either ambitious goals should be set so as to have some 
room to manoeuvre during the negotiations, or the opposite in order to avoid that the 
proposal, like last time, would not be taken seriously. The result is a modernisation of the 
budget, which, as such, is in line with the new priorities set in the framework of Europe 2020 
which aims at smart, sustainable and inclusive growth with high levels of employment. In this 
context, Lewandowski commissioned a consortium, led by the ECORYS research agency, to 
study the extent to which the subsidiarity principle applies to spending in the context of the 
European budget. To this end, the efficiency and feasibility of a large number of policy fields 
were examined. One of the conclusions of the study is that a large part of the agricultural 
policy could be decentralised , while at the same time centralisation of environmental policy 
and security policy is justified
24
. Transferring these policy areas to the EU need not affect the 
budget, since regulation and coordination is largely sufficient in these areas
25
.  
In total, the multiannual budget represents 1.05% of GNI, which is in line with the call of 9 of 
the 27 Member States to limit the increase in the budget to inflation correction. However, the 
percentage rises to 1.11% of GNI if ‘off budget’ expenditure is taken into account as well; in 
this way Lewandowski follows the view of the European Parliament that ‘…freezing the next 
MFF at the 2013 level … is not a viable option …[and that] at least a 5% increase of 
resources is needed for the next MFF’26. The consolidated budget, i.e. the sum of ‘on budget’ 
and ‘off budget’ expenditure, thus provides for an increase of the expenditure ceiling27.  
                                                          
21. Cipriani, Gabriele (2007), Rethinking the EU Budget. Three Unavoidable Reforms, Brussels: 
Centre for European Reform, p. 19, p. 130. 
22. The so-called Budget Review was carried out by the European Commission through a public 
consultation in 2007/2008. Member States as well as civil society organisations published their 
views on a website launched by the European Commission (European Commission (2011a). For 
contributions to the public consultation, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform2008/issues/read_en.htm, last visited: April 2011). Due to a 
reshuffle of the European Commission, the debate on the European budget mainly took place in the 
academic world (Laffan, Bridget; Lindner, Johannes (2010), ‘The Budget: Who Gets What, When 
and How’, in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark Pollack (eds.) Policy-Making in the 
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
23. European Commission (2010), Budget Review: Lessons Learnt for Tomorrow's Budget, Brussels. 
24. ECORYS, CPB and IFO (2008), op. cit., p. 248. 
25. Molle, Willem (2008), Assessing the Structure of EU Expenditures, paper delivered at the BEPA 
Conference on Public Finances in the EU, under the auspices of the European Commission, 
Brussels, 4 April, 2008. 
26. European Parliament (2011), Resolution of 8 June 2011 on Investing in the Future: A New 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for a Competitive, Sustainable and Inclusive Europe, 
Strasbourg. 
27. Mijs, Arnout; Schout, Adriaan (2012), ‘Views on the Commission’s Draft EU Budget. Excessively 
Ambitious or Overly Timid?’, EPIN Working Paper, no. 32, p. 9. 
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The Commission proposal contains a number of controversial and drastic measures. For 
instance, on the revenue side of the budget it wants to include a new own resource, financial 
transaction tax [FTT], which would reduce contributions by Member States by 50%. In 
addition, the Commission wishes to introduce a generic correction mechanism. The amount 
that Member States are allowed to keep for collecting traditional own resources [TOR] will be 
further reduced [from 25% to 10%], which will have major consequences for the Dutch 
standpoint given the import levies collected at the port of Rotterdam. Unlike last time, 
Lewandowski has tabled a 1.050 million rebate on the Dutch contribution. The proposal 
concerning the expenditure side of the budget is lower than that proposed during the previous 
negotiations. However, a number of budget items, such as the Globalisation Fund and the 
Solidarity Fund, are placed off budget, thus distorting the picture of actual spending. The 
proposal also provides for a reform of the agricultural policy [reducing the difference in 
acreage price which is used as a basis for income support] and of the structural funds by 
introducing the category of transition regions [regions that are making the transition from 
subsidy to no subsidy]. 
 
5. The Dutch position 
The cabinet decided to follow a pro-active strategy and did not wait for Lewandowski’s 
proposal. It announced the Dutch position as early 28 March 2011
28
. The primary aim is 
modernisation of the European budget, namely: 
 A frugal and effective budget, i.e. limitation of the increase in expenditure, staying below 
inflation.  
 A future-proof budget, that is, one that reflects the priorities of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
The funds for these priorities should be generated by exchanging ‘old for new’29. 
 Balanced burden-sharing by replacing the current patchwork of own resources by a 
system fully based on Gross National Income [GNI]
30
 
The payment correction serves as a bargaining chip and can be dropped if sufficient progress 
is made on the abovementioned points. The question is whether it is wise to show our hand 
already at this stage. In any case, it makes clear what the Dutch position is. 
The Dutch position, as such, is similar to that at the time of the Financial Perspectives 2007-
2013
31
 
32
, although it should be noted that circumstances have since changed drastically, thus 
making it more difficult for the Netherlands to attain its goals
33
: 
                                                          
28. Letter from the cabinet to the chairperson of the Dutch House of Representatives regarding the EU 
Multiannual Framework as of 2014, dated 28 March 2011 (TwK 2011a). 
29. To this end, the common agricultural policy and the administrative expenditure would have to be 
nominally frozen and the cohesion policy limited to the least prosperous regions in the least 
prosperous countries. 
30. Introducing a generic system based on GNI also means abolishing the traditional own resources, 
thus immediately relieving us in one go from the accounting discussion on the contribution of part 
of the levy on imports. As a result, the rebate on the Dutch contribution could even turn out higher. 
31. Mijs and Schout (2012) op. cit., p. 10. 
32. However, some aspects of the Dutch position have altered. For instance, the Netherlands is in 
favour of nominal instead of real growth of the budget. In addition, the government is more relaxed 
about increasing flexibility within the European budget.   
33. Unlike during the negotiations on the Financial Perspectives 2006-2013, the Netherlands is unable 
to exert influence by using the rotating Presidency. 
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 The influence of the new Member States, which at the time had only just acceded, has 
grown considerably [agricultural subsidies, structural funds]; 
 The already prominent role of the European Council in this regard has been further 
strengthened by the appointment of the permanent President of the European Council, 
thus further weakening the role of the rotating Presidency; 
 The Treaty of Lisbon has considerably reinforced the role of the European Parliament, 
though it should be noted that the EP is internally divided. The EP is moreover inclined to 
agree as long as the new level of expenditure is higher than the previous level
34
. 
A not insignificant difference is the Dutch pursuit of nominal instead of real growth, de facto 
resulting in regression. To this end, the government has teamed up with the leaders of four 
other Member States – Germany, Finland, France and the United Kingdom – which argue that 
as of 2014 the growth of the European budget should remain below inflation
35
. An increase in 
the European budget is hard to justify at times that drastic spending cuts have to be made at 
national level
36. The government’s view has been further reinforced as result of a motion 
tabled by the PvdA and Christen Unie during the parliamentary debate on the State of the 
European Union on 26 May 2011, exhorting the government, besides going for retention of 
the Dutch contribution rebate of at least 1 billion, not to agree with a European multiannual 
budget that goes beyond the nominal zero line
37
. The question at this moment is: what is the 
status of this motion now that the outgoing cabinet is no longer dependent on the PvdA [and 
CU] for a majority in parliament? To what extent is the ‘new coalition’ prepared to support 
the position of the outgoing cabinet? At the time of writing, the matter is pending until a new 
cabinet has been formed
38
. 
In principle, there is not much to be said against the arguments to modernise the European 
budget. This could, to begin with, take the form of greater transparency, like that seen in the 
changes made in the budget template due to the introduction of performance budgeting
39
. A 
transparent budget forms the basis for a better allocation of available resources and for 
controlling the legality and efficiency of expenditure, and, as such, contributes to legitimacy. 
However, the chance that the above points will be realised seems remote. An indication of the 
current balance of power within the EU is provided by the consultations that took place in the 
framework of the abovementioned Budget Review. They are a good reflection of Member 
States’ views, which are generally stable, irrespective of the composition of the incumbent 
government coalition
40
.  
                                                          
34. The Multiannual Financial Framework is adopted by the Council and the European Parliament in 
consultation with the Economic and Social Committee pursuant to the ordinary legislative 
procedure. Specific programmes are adopted by the Council in consultation with the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee pursuant to the extraordinary procedure. 
35. Cameron, David et al. (2010). Letter from Prime Minister David Cameron and other European 
leaders to the President of the European Commission, London, 18 December. 
36. In this context, the Prime Minister signed a letter together with the heads of state and government 
of Germany, Finland, France and the United Kingdom to the President of the European 
Commission, dated 18 December 2010, Dutch House of Representatives, House Minutes 21 501-
20, no. 496. 
37. Dutch House of Representatives, House Minutes 32 502, no. 6. 
38. Outgoing Prime Minister Rutte recently stepped up the pressure even further when he arrived in 
Brussels for a two-day European summit. In his opinion, the EU budget for 2014-2012 must go 
down by 10 per cent (Coevert, Annemarie (2012), ‘Rutte: EU-begroting moet tien procent omlaag’ 
[Rutte: EU budget must go down by 10 per cent’], NRC Handelsblad, 28 June. 
39. The number of articles was reduced considerably to improve allocation, efficiency and 
accountability. 
40. Lindner, Johannes (2006), Conflict and Change in EU Budgetary Politics, London: Routledge. 
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Figure 3: Member States’ positions on contributions and the expenditure ceiling41 
 
Member 
States 
Contributions to the EU   Expenditure framework  
  Abolish 
rebates 
Generic 
correction 
mechanism 
New tax / 
own 
resources  
Limited 
growth 
Middle 
position 
Expenditure 
follows 
objectives  
Austria             
Belgium             
Bulgaria             
Cyprus             
Czech Rep.             
Denmark             
Estonia              
Finland             
France             
Germany             
Greece             
Hungary              
Ireland             
Italy             
Latvia             
Lithuania             
Luxembourg             
Malta             
Netherlands             
Poland             
Portugal             
Romania             
Slovakia             
Slovenia             
Spain             
Sweden             
UK             
       
  Pro   Middle   Contra 
  
A majority of the European Member States seems to be in favour of abolishing the rebate on 
the contribution, which will be probably vetoed though by the UK government. In the last 
phase of the negotiations on the present multiannual budget, then Prime Minister Tony Blair 
did offer an opening as regards the British rebate – he was prepared to give up the British 
rebate in exchange for abolition of the agricultural subsidies
42
 – but the door was closed by 
                                                          
41. European Commission (2010) op. cit.; Blankenstein, Richard (2011) Onderhandelen over het 
meerjarig financieel kader van de EU – Een nieuw spel met andere spelers? [Negotiating the 
Multiannual Financial Framework of the EU – A new game with different players?], Rotterdam: 
thesis. 
42. BBC News (2005), ‘Blair Says EU Rebate “Has to Go” ’, 21 June, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4114180.stm, retrieved 9 April 2012; Núñez 
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the then French president Chirac. At that time, he was not prepared to talk about restructuring 
the agricultural policy
43
. 
Figure 4:  Member States’ positions on the agricultural policy and the structural funds44 
Member 
States 
Agricultural budget Cohesion fund  
  Budget size 
Abolition of 
income 
support  
National co- 
financing  
of pillar 1 
Limiting 
funds to poor 
regions in 
poor Member 
States 
Middle 
position  
Funds for all 
Member 
States 
Austria             
Belgium             
Bulgaria             
Cyprus             
Czech Rep.             
Denmark             
Estonia              
Finland             
France             
Germany             
Greece             
Hungary             
Ireland             
Italy             
Latvia              
Lithuania              
Luxembourg             
Malta             
Netherlands              
Poland             
Portugal             
Romania             
Slovakia             
Slovenia             
Spain             
Sweden             
UK             
       
  Pro   Middle   Contra 
  
The moratorium on phasing out income support in agriculture may have expired by the end of 
2013, but these parties are still polar opposites – judging by the consultations held in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ferrer, Jorge (2007), The EU Budget: The UK Rebate and the CAP – Phasing Them Both Out, 
Brussels: CEPS. 
43. BBC News (2005), op. cit.  
44. European Commission (2010) op. cit.; Blankenstein (2011) op. cit. 
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framework of the Budget Review. The same seems to apply to limiting the structural funds to 
the poorest regions. The Member States cannot agree on this either. 
Further analysis shows that the disagreement is considerable. On the one hand, the allocation 
of the scarce resources should be [more] aligned to the new priorities set in the context of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. On the other hand, the growth of expenditure should be curtailed, 
taking the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis into consideration for the budgets of the 
Member States. It remains to be seen though whether the pursuit of modernising the European 
budget will lead to merely cosmetic rather than fundamental changes. What will be the 
government’s fall-back position if there indeed proves to be insufficient support for the Dutch 
position? 
 
Fall-back position: ‘juste retour’ or ‘self-interest rightly understood’?  
For some time now, the significance of the European Union in our country seems to narrow 
down to a discussion on our net contribution and the place where the European Parliament 
should meet
45
. In the media, outgoing Prime Minister Rutte has, on several occasions, spoken 
in favour of a permanent rebate on the Dutch contribution
46
. However, the rebate is dropping 
to about 750 million because the Netherlands is supposed to contribute to the rebates of the 
other Member States
47
. The Commission proposal moreover suggests reducing the part of the 
traditional own resources that the Member States are allowed to keep from 25% to 10%, thus 
decreasing the amount to around 500 million
48
. The result is nothing to write home about
49
. 
The aim of getting a rebate on our contribution to the EU therefore nets far less than 
anticipated. The outgoing Rutte cabinet seems to have been fooling itself as the amount of 1 
billion has already been factored into the coalition agreement. Prime Minister’s Rutte words 
therefore seem to be mainly intended for domestic consumption. In this context, it should be 
borne in mind that the current MFF will indeed continue to apply if no agreement is reached 
on the MFF for the coming period, but that the temporary rebate will be dropped
50
. In that 
case, the cabinet will be left completely empty-handed. However, it seems likely that as of 
2014 a new retrospective rebate will apply if agreement is reached later than expected. 
Considering all this, what is there left to be ‘gained’? Restructuring the revenue side of the 
budget, relieving the Netherlands in one go from the accounting discussion on the 
contribution of port dues and the resulting reputation damage which is hard to express in 
monetary terms, does not seem politically feasible. Quite the contrary, the Commission even 
proposes to introduce two new own resources – a financial transaction tax [FTT] and a new 
VAT resource – to make the budget less dependent on the Member States’ contributions. 
Possibilities should therefore be found on the expenditure side of the budget, although it 
seems impossible to find a majority for either scaling down the agricultural policy or focusing 
the structural funds on the poorer regions. In the field of administrative costs there just is not 
                                                          
45. Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (Advisory Council on International Affairs) (2006), 
Europe: A Priority!, The Hague, p. 8; Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (2007), The 
Finances of the European Union, The Hague, p. 10. 
46. For the record, a 1 billion rebate on a contribution of around 4 billion does not even amount to 1 
per cent of our gross national income. 
47. Reaction of the cabinet to the Commission proposals for the Multiannual Financial Framework of 
the EU for 2014-2020, 2 September 2011, p. 3. 
48. See Annex 3. 
49. This amount moreover pales into insignificance compared to the guarantees we issued in the 
framework of the European emergency fund. 
50. The temporary rebate on our EU contribution will be dropped, but the permanent VAT payment 
correction – 0.1% instead of 0.3% – will, in principle, be maintained. 
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much to be gained. What can, or must – given this starting point – be the government’s 
position during the negotiations on the new MFF? 
The interest of the Dutch government, though, seems to lie in a qualitative discussion on the 
content of the budget rather than in a quantitative discussion on its size. Instead of thinking in 
terms of ‘juste retour’, the government should focus more strongly on our ‘self-interest 
rightly understood’, whereby limitation of the increase in expenditure to inflation correction 
could be used as a bargaining chip. In line with the Commission proposal, the Dutch 
government should pursue a reallocation of existing resources in favour of activities that 
increase productivity and thus competitiveness in economically underdeveloped regions
51
 
52
.  
A European budget aimed at economic growth is also to the Dutch advantage because, as 
calculated by the Centraal Planbureau [CPB - Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis], we benefit relatively from the export of goods
53
. The results of the ECORYS study 
could serve as a guideline in this context, although control of spending should be tightened in 
order to ensure that the intended target group is reached and effectiveness increased. Still, 
effectiveness is not the only criterion by which expenditure should be assessed. The European 
integration process is based on solidarity. A positive side effect of a strategy aimed at 
economic growth is that migration flows subside as economic growth in economically 
underdeveloped regions picks up and, thus taking the wind out of populist sails.  
 
6. Concluding remarks: towards a more enlightened European budget  
In this chapter we addressed the Dutch position during the negotiations on the multiannual 
budget for 2014-2020. The government supports the proposal of the European Commission to 
modernise the budget. However, given the balance of power, the chance that the revenue side 
of the budget will be restructured seems to be slim. In this respect, it should also be borne in 
mind that the Netherlands had been a net recipient until the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Improvement should therefore take place on the expenditure side of the budget. The most that 
can be achieved seems a reallocation of resources in favour van the priorities set in the 
framework of Europe 2020. Particularly zooming in on those issues that are in line with Dutch 
priorities, such as asylum policy, security policy and preventing climate change, seems the 
obvious choice. However, in this context it should be noted that the flexibility of the budget is 
limited.  
In addition and in line with the advice already issued at the time by the Sapir study group, the 
EU budget should focus more on economic growth
54
. Or, in the words of Pisani-Ferry, 
Director of Bruegel in Brussels: 
‘… as ECB President Mario Draghi recently said, Europe has a fiscal compact, but 
lacks a growth compact. To be sure, there are no quick fixes: headline-grabbing 
initiatives often fail to measure up to the challenge of reviving growth. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
51. Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (2010), The EU and the Crisis. Lessons learnt, The Hague. 
52. In this context it is worth considering not relating the growth of expenditure, a priori, to inflation, 
but rather to the Europe 2020 strategy which is aimed at economic growth and employment. 
53. Straathof, Bas et al. (2008), The Internal Market and the Dutch Economy: Implications for Trade 
and Economic Growth, The Hague: CPB. 
54. Sapir, André (2003), Agenda for Growing Europe. Making the EU Economic System Deliver, 
Report of an Independent High-Level Study Group established on the initiative of the President of 
the European Commission, available at: 
http://serviziweb.unimol.it/unimol/allegati/docenti/2545/materiale/sapir%20report.pdf, retrieved 2 
April 2012. 
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serious discussion is needed concerning how to use the EU budget to enhance 
economic performance, rather than for redistribution only; how to foster pro-growth 
reforms at the national level; and how to boost investment in the periphery countries’ 
tradable sectors. A credible growth compact would help to overcome immediate 
hurdles. After all, the post-war Marshall Plan was so successful not because of its size, 
but because it helped to counteract zero-sum games and self-fulfilling pessimism. 
That is a lesson to keep in mind today’55 56. 
To what extent is a European budget that focuses more on economic growth politically 
possible? The balance of power indicates that most Member States are in favour of 
modernising the budget, but opinions are strongly divided over how that should be achieved. 
It seems virtually impossible to get all parties to agree, unless the discussion on the European 
budget is placed in a different context, i.e. that of the sovereign debt crisis. A ‘frame shift’ is a 
tried and tested means of breaking a deadlock in negotiations. The revision of the definition of 
the problem may reveal new ways of solving the problem, which are moreover easier ‘to sell’ 
to one’s grass roots supporters by referring to the sovereign debt crisis. 
In answer to the question posed in the title of this chapter, it may be concluded that 
reallocation of the European budget will not be sufficient to do justice to the priorities set in 
the context of the Europe 2020 strategy. Increasing the level of expenditure seems to be 
inevitable – even if support is found for reallocation – to meet the many, deviating wishes of 
all Member States
57
. A European budget that focuses more on economic growth may also help 
reduce existing macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro zone. The budget of the European 
Union will thus implicitly flesh out the G-pillar of the Stability and Growth Pact and the E-
pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union, thus eliminating the asymmetry in the 
institutional architecture. 
  
                                                          
55. Pisani-Ferry, Jean (2012), ‘France and the Netherlands Strike Back’, Project Syndicate, 30 April, 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/france-and-the-netherlands-strike-back, retrieved 5 
May 2012. 
56. According to Angela Merkel, one of the options would be a larger role for the European 
Investment Bank borrowing cheap and then lending the money to banks and businesses on 
favourable conditions (Pop, Valentina (2012), ‘More Money for EU Investment Bank As Leaders 
Re-focus on Growth’, EU Observer, 30 April). 
57. Since it has been joined by Denmark, Italy, Austria and Sweden, the anti-coalition has more than 
half of the votes [163 of the 345 votes]. Those against increasing expenditure may be in the 
minority, but they can use their veto considering the unanimity required by the multiannual 
framework. 
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Annex 1: Proposal of the European Commission for the Multiannual Financial 
Framework of the EU as of 2014 
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Annex 2: Net position by EU Member State in 2009
58
 
 
 Revenue Payments Reimbursement 
2007-2008 
Net 
Austria 1.822 2.316 -31 -463 
Belgium 2.464 4.661 205 -1.993 
Bulgaria 903 390 17 530 
Cyprus 197 199 9 6 
Czech Republic 2.988 1.374 72 1.686 
Denmark 1.400 2.491 144 -947 
Estonia 710 159 9 561 
Finland 1.230 1.814 110 -473 
France 14.228 20.093 1.096 -4.769 
Germany 11.865 20.510 -1.736 -10.382 
Greece 5.450 2.425 126 3.152 
Hungary  3.775 909 51 2.918 
Ireland 1.940 1.534 92 498 
Italy 9.625 15.418 949 -4.844 
Latvia 733 216 12 529 
Lithuania 1.803 322 17 1.497 
Luxembourg 166 287 17 -104 
Malta 65 64 3 4 
Netherlands 2.007 3.337 -2.109 -3.439 
Poland 9.543 3.134 146 6.556 
Portugal 3.724 1.637 89 2.177 
Romania  2.791 1.342 61 1.510 
Slovakia 1.236 712 37 561 
Slovenia 636 428 19 227 
Spain 11.875 11.170 593 1.297 
Sweden 1.463 1.855 -609 -1.002 
United Kingdom 6.221 10.112 524 -3.377 
 
  
                                                          
58. Algemene Rekenkamer [Court of Audit] (2011), EU-trendrapport 2011; Ontwikkelingen in het 
financieel management van de Europese Unie [EU trend report 2011; Developments in the 
financial management of the European Union], Dutch House of Representatives, House Minutes 
32 624, no. 1, pp. 44-45. 
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Annex 3: Calculation rebate on Dutch contribution
59
 
 
Gross rebate  1.050 
 Contribution to rebate pool   -375 
 Contribution UK rebate 75 Dropped 
Net rebate  750 
 Reduction cost of collection  -250 
 Balance 
 
500 
  
 
                                                          
59. Data provided by the Ministry of Finance. 
